This article, Based on a study of the "euthyphro," "apology" and "crito," suggests that for socrates (and therefore, Presumably, The young plato) piety is service to the dialectic, And that for socrates the dialectic itself takes over the position reserved in the popular religion for the gods (thus making socrates guilty, At least metaphorically, Of the charge of believing in "other new divine powers"). Part one seeks to establish that the dialectic controls the pious man's beliefs; part two, That it (...) controls his destiny; and part three, That it controls his identity. Failure to engage in, Or disobedience to the dialectic "leads to the worst forms of immorality, And brings down judgments that reduce the gods to low comedy, Men to tragedy." it is further argued that because socrates held the dialectic to be fundamental, He also held that the only just form of government is democracy. (shrink)

This contribution to the Common Knowledge symposium “Antipolitics” A considers what it might mean for the administrative state to be antipolitical. Two conceptions of an antipolitical administrative state are identified. The first of these—antipolitics as in opposition to administrative discretion—holds that, in a democracy, value judgments should be made only by elected officials and that all administrators should do is carry out technical tasks calling for expertise. Administrators, however, inevitably make policy decisions that call for value judgments, making this first (...) conception unattainable. On the other hand, a second conception or standard—one of antipolitics as in opposition to favoritism—is both realistic and desirable to expect of those who occupy positions of administrative power. It holds that administrators should avoid making decisions for self-interested reasons. Many doctrines of administrative law follow from aversion to favoritism, as the law aspires to free the administrative state from decision-making that is based on the interests of administrators and their partisan overseers or friends. Today, as the state comes under increasing threat from populist and authoritarian attempts to capture its power, distinguishing between these two conceptions of antipolitics—one unrealistic, the other imperative—can help to channel antipolitical impulses where they are most needed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:158. RELATIVE IDEAS REVISITED: A REPLY TO THOMAS In "Hume's Relative Ideas" I argued that what Hume called a "relative idea" is the cognitive analogue of a definite description, that relative ideas are nonimagistic, and that recognizing the distinction between positive ideas (images) and relative ideas sheds light on various issues that remain opaque apart from that distinction. Thomas has recently taken exception to my position, contending that I (...) have "produced a 2 theory without application in Hume's framework." In reply I shall present the three cornerstones of my view and then turn to Thomas's criticisms. I. On Relative Ideas 1.What relative ideas are: In claiming that a relative idea is the cognitive analogue of a definite description, I mean only that a relative idea functions in the cognitive realm (realm of ideas) in the same way that a definite description functions in the linguistic realm. Just as the statement expressing the contextual definition of a definite description specifies the truth conditions for a statement containing that description, the statement expressing the contextual definition of a definite description corresponding to a relative idea indicates the (factual) conditions that must obtain if that relative idea succeeds in singling out an entity, i.e., it specifies the "truth conditions" for a relative idea (see T 448, T 458, and T 84 for Hume's use of 'truth'). 2.The intellectual milieu: The expressions 'relative idea' and 'relative notion' seem to have at least two uses in eighteenth century philosophy. Some philosophers used such expressions to refer to an idea 4 or a conception of a relation. Nonetheless, since no 159. substance theorist held that a substance is a relation, this can hardly be the sense in which Locke used the expression when he claimed that one has an "obscure and relative idea of substance in general." Further, Locke's discussion of the relationship between positive ideas (images) and the relative idea of substance clearly indicates that relative ideas provide an indirect means of allowing one to know what something is on the basis of its relation to something known directly, i.e., on the basis of its relation to a C positive idea. Locke also claimed that one's idea of 7 infinity is a relative idea, he seems to have held that the idea of power is a relative idea, and given his account of perception, it is at least reasonable to suggest that relative ideas are found in perceptual contexts. Similarly, Berkeley maintained that one has a relative notion of immaterial substance, but no relative notion of material substance, since in the former case, but not in the latter, one has a notion 9 of the relation between: a substance and its attributes. Outside the "way of ideas" one finds the distinction between direct and relative "conception" clearly spelled out in Reid' s Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. Reid wrote: Of some things, we know what they are in themselves; our conception of such things I call direct. Of other things, we do not know what they are in themselves, but only that they have certain properties or attributes, or certain relations to other things; of these our conception is only relative. 10 Reid contended that our conceptions of mind, of body, of powers, and of secondary qualities are relative conceptions, that at least some of our conceptions of large numbers of things and of polygons are relative conceptions, and that relative conceptions are operative in memory. Now given that there seems to have been a fairly 160. widely recognized doctrine of relative conception in the eighteenth century, given that the contexts in which Hume used the term 'relative idea' are contexts in which proponents of relative conception employed that term, and given that Hume stated philosophical issues in terms of the conceptual system of his time, I consider it reasonable to suggest that Hume recognized and held a doctrine of relative conception even though he did not devote so much as a paragraph to stating that doctrine. 3. The relation of images to relative ideas: A relative idea is inherently complex: it includes a positive idea (or ideas) and a relation... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:158. RELATIVE IDEAS REVISITED: A REPLY TO THOMAS In "Hume's Relative Ideas" I argued that what Hume called a "relative idea" is the cognitive analogue of a definite description, that relative ideas are nonimagistic, and that recognizing the distinction between positive ideas (images) and relative ideas sheds light on various issues that remain opaque apart from that distinction. Thomas has recently taken exception to my position, contending that I (...) have "produced a 2 theory without application in Hume's framework." In reply I shall present the three cornerstones of my view and then turn to Thomas's criticisms. I. On Relative Ideas 1.What relative ideas are: In claiming that a relative idea is the cognitive analogue of a definite description, I mean only that a relative idea functions in the cognitive realm (realm of ideas) in the same way that a definite description functions in the linguistic realm. Just as the statement expressing the contextual definition of a definite description specifies the truth conditions for a statement containing that description, the statement expressing the contextual definition of a definite description corresponding to a relative idea indicates the (factual) conditions that must obtain if that relative idea succeeds in singling out an entity, i.e., it specifies the "truth conditions" for a relative idea (see T 448, T 458, and T 84 for Hume's use of 'truth'). 2.The intellectual milieu: The expressions 'relative idea' and 'relative notion' seem to have at least two uses in eighteenth century philosophy. Some philosophers used such expressions to refer to an idea 4 or a conception of a relation. Nonetheless, since no 159. substance theorist held that a substance is a relation, this can hardly be the sense in which Locke used the expression when he claimed that one has an "obscure and relative idea of substance in general." Further, Locke's discussion of the relationship between positive ideas (images) and the relative idea of substance clearly indicates that relative ideas provide an indirect means of allowing one to know what something is on the basis of its relation to something known directly, i.e., on the basis of its relation to a C positive idea. Locke also claimed that one's idea of 7 infinity is a relative idea, he seems to have held that the idea of power is a relative idea, and given his account of perception, it is at least reasonable to suggest that relative ideas are found in perceptual contexts. Similarly, Berkeley maintained that one has a relative notion of immaterial substance, but no relative notion of material substance, since in the former case, but not in the latter, one has a notion 9 of the relation between: a substance and its attributes. Outside the "way of ideas" one finds the distinction between direct and relative "conception" clearly spelled out in Reid' s Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. Reid wrote: Of some things, we know what they are in themselves; our conception of such things I call direct. Of other things, we do not know what they are in themselves, but only that they have certain properties or attributes, or certain relations to other things; of these our conception is only relative. 10 Reid contended that our conceptions of mind, of body, of powers, and of secondary qualities are relative conceptions, that at least some of our conceptions of large numbers of things and of polygons are relative conceptions, and that relative conceptions are operative in memory. Now given that there seems to have been a fairly 160. widely recognized doctrine of relative conception in the eighteenth century, given that the contexts in which Hume used the term 'relative idea' are contexts in which proponents of relative conception employed that term, and given that Hume stated philosophical issues in terms of the conceptual system of his time, I consider it reasonable to suggest that Hume recognized and held a doctrine of relative conception even though he did not devote so much as a paragraph to stating that doctrine. 3. The relation of images to relative ideas: A relative idea is inherently complex: it includes a positive idea (or ideas) and a relation... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On Friedman's Look Daniel E. Flage In a pair of articles and a book (Flage 1985a, 1985b, 1990), I argued that Hume's ideas of memory are relative ideas. In "Another Look at Flage's Hume" (this volume), Lesley Friedman challenges my account on four points. She argues (1) that it is possible to remember simple ideas in their simplicity; (2) that I have misrepresented Humean impressions ofreflection; (3) that (...) I have overlooked the importance of force and vivacity in Hume's account ofmemory; and (4) that there is no textual evidence for claiming that Humean ideas of memory are relative ideas. In addition, she contends that my interpretation cannot account for mis-remembering. In this paper I show that some of the problems Friedman finds with myinterpretation arise from myreading of Lockean distinctions into the Treatise while others stem from my conflation of distinctions drawn in the first Enquiry with comparable distinctions in the Treatise. 1. Remembering simple ideas My argument that Humean ideas ofmemory are relative ideas is based primarily on Hume's remarks in three passages. In Treatise 1.1.3, one finds this: "the imagination is not restrain'd to the same order and form with the original impressions; while the memory is in a manner tytt down in that respect, without any power of variation."1 Later in the same passage one finds this: Tis evident, that the memory preserves the original form, in which its objects were presented, and that where-ever we depart from it in recollecting any thing, it proceeds from some defect or imperfection in that faculty.... The chiefexercise of memory is not to preserve the simple ideas, but their order and position. (T 9) And in Treatise 1.3.5, one finds this: These faculties [memory and imagination] are as little distinguish'd from each other by the arrangement of their complexideas. For tho'itbe apeculiar propertyofthe memory to preserve the original order and position of its ideas, while the imagination transposes and changes them, as it pleases; yet this difference is not sufficient to distinguish them in their Volume XLX Number 1 187 DANIEL E. FLAGE operation, or make us know the one from the other; it being impossible to recai the past impressions, in order to compare them with our present ideas, and see whether their arrangement be exactly similar. (T 85) This is only one characteristic ofideas ofmemory, the other being the greater degree of"force andvivacity" in an idea ofthe memory vis-à-vis an idea ofthe imagination (T 9, 85). I call this characteristic the formal criterion (Flage 1985a, 171); Friedman calls it the external difference (p. 178). These passages show that ideas of the memory represent earlier impressions, or ideas, or "events," or things known.2 How do they do so? Given the remarks on the preservation of"order and form" and "order and position," and given that resemblance alone is not sufficient to distinguish nonmnemonic ideas from mnemonic ideas (see T 9), I argued that there is an implicit causal thesis: an idea ofmemory singles out the impression that was its original cause. It is a relative idea corresponding to a definite description ofthe form, "the impression that is the (original) cause of and exactly (or closely) resembles m," where 'm' denotes a particular positive idea. (Flage 1985a, 172)3 If my account of memory is correct, there is a positive idea ("mental image") that provides the basis for every relative idea of memory. Further, this positive idea must be complex. Friedman objects (pp. 180-81) that insofar as my account requires that there be a complex positive idea that provides the basis for one's relative idea of memory, this conflicts with several passages in the Treatise. She cites the ink spot experiment (T 42) as showing that one can have a simple impression of colour. She remarks, "Since we can have such a simple impression, we can also remember it" (p. 180), adding, "It seems clear that Hume thinks that in the [ink spot] experiment, all that is present in one's visual field is the spot of ink" (ibid.). Since I had argued that "Hume's example ofseeing a minimum... (shrink)

Although Business Ethics has become a topic of wide discussion in both academia and the corporate world, questions remain as how to present ethical issues in a manner that will effectively influence the decisions and behavior of business employees. In this paper we argue that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (FSG) offer a unique opportunity for bridging the gap between the theory and practice of business ethics. We first explain what the FSG are and how they apply to organizations. We then (...) show how discussions of the FSG might be used in business ethics courses in a way that is both theoretically sound and practically applicable. Finally, we show how the requirements of the FSG can be used by companies to develop effective ethical compliance programs. As such, we maintain that the FSG provide a powerful heuristic tool for the teaching and training of business ethics. (shrink)

The questions and methods of molecular biology and evolutionary biology are clearly distinct, yet a unified approach can lead to deep insights. Unfortunately, attempts to unify these approaches are fraught with pitfalls. In this informal series of questions and answers, we offer the mechanistically oriented biologist a set of steps to come up with evolutionarily reasonable and meaningful hypotheses. We emphasize the critical power and importance of carefully constructed null hypotheses, and we illustrate our ideas with examples representing a (...) range of topics, from the biology of aging, to protein structure, to speciation, and more. We also stress the importance of mathematics as the lingua franca for biologists of all stripes, and encourage mechanistic biologists to seek out quantitative collaborators to build explicit mathematical models, making their assumptions explicit, and their logic clear and testable. Biologists in all realms of inquiry stand to gain from strong bridges between our disciplines. (shrink)

This article explores the plausibility of some intuitions and counter intuitions about the anti-corruption efforts of MDBs and international organizations leveraging the power of the private sector. Regulation of a sizable percentage of global private sector actors now falls into a new area of international governance with innovative institutions, standards, and programs. We wrestle with the role and value of private sector partnerships and available informal and formal social controls. Crafting proportional informal controls (e.g., monitoring, evaluations, and sanctions) and (...) proper incentives to cooperative games across networks are the lynchpins of successful collective action programs. Ambivalence with informal social controls or effective incentives, we argue, risks far too much deference to private sector interests. (shrink)

These studies examined whether having thoughts related to an event before it occurs leads people to infer that they caused the event— even when such causation might otherwise seem magical. In Study 1, people perceived that they had harmed another person via a voodoo hex. These perceptions were more likely among those who had first been induced to harbor evil thoughts about their victim. In Study 2, spectators of a peer’s basketball-shooting performance were more likely to perceive that they had (...) influenced his success if they had first generated positive visualizations consistent with that success. Observers privy to those spectators’ visualizations made similar attributions about the spectators’ influence. Finally, addi- tional studies suggested that these results occur even when the thought-about outcome is viewed as unwanted by the thinker and even in field settings where the relevant outcome is occurring as part of a live athletic competition. (shrink)

Although eye tracking has been used extensively to assess cognitions for static stimuli, recent research suggests that the link between gaze and cognition may be more tenuous for dynamic stimuli such as videos. Part of the difficulty in convincingly linking gaze with cognition is that in dynamic stimuli, gaze position is strongly influenced by exogenous cues such as object motion. However, tests of the gaze‐cognition link in dynamic stimuli have been done on only a limited range of stimuli often characterized (...) by highly organized motion. Also, analyses of cognitive contrasts between participants have been mostly been limited to categorical contrasts among small numbers of participants that may have limited the power to observe more subtle influences. We, therefore, tested for cognitive influences on gaze for screen‐captured instructional videos, the contents of which participants were tested on. Between‐participant scanpath similarity predicted between‐participant similarity in responses on test questions, but with imperfect consistency across videos. We also observed that basic gaze parameters and measures of attention to centers of interest only inconsistently predicted learning, and that correlations between gaze and centers of interest defined by other‐participant gaze and cursor movement did not predict learning. It, therefore, appears that the search for eye movement indices of cognition during dynamic naturalistic stimuli may be fruitful, but we also agree that the tyranny of dynamic stimuli is real, and that links between eye movements and cognition are highly dependent on task and stimulus properties. (shrink)

In The Art Instinct, Denis Dutton promoted a theoretical framework that “has more validity, more power, and more possibilities than the hermetic discourse that deadens so much of the humanities.”1 This framework is Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural and sexual selection. Dutton proposed to seek “human universals that underlie the vast cacophony of cultural differences and across the globe” (AI, p. 39), based on a shared, evolved human nature.This contrasts with the relativistic presumptions of those falling under (...) the shadow of Margaret Mead and Clifford Geertz, or “the dogmas of Freud, the speculations of Jung, the sterile formulations of behaviorism, all variously empty or misleading” (p. 37). Also .. (shrink)

Categorical loudness scaling (CLS) measures provide useful information about an individual’s loudness perception across the dynamic range of hearing. A probability model of CLS categories has previously been described as a multi-category psychometric function (MCPF). In the study, a representative “catalog” of potential listener MCPFs was used in conjunction with maximum-likelihood estimation to derive CLS functions for participants with normal hearing and with hearing loss. The approach of estimating MCPFs for each listener has the potential to improve the accuracy of (...) the CLS measurements, particularly when a relatively low number of data points are available. The present study extends the MCPF approach by using Bayesian inference to select stimulus parameters that are predicted to yield maximum expected information (MEI) during data collection. The accuracy and reliability of the MCPF-MEI approach were compared to the standardized CLS measurement procedure (ISO16832:2006). A non-adaptive, fixed-level, paradigm served as a “gold-standard” for this comparison. The test time required to obtain measurements in the standard procedure is a major barrier to its clinical uptake. Test time was reduced from approximately 15 minutes to approximately 3 minutes with the MEI-adaptive procedure. Results indicated that the test-retest reliability and accuracy of the MCPF-MEI adaptive procedures were similar to the standardized CLS procedure. Computer simulations suggest that the reliability and accuracy of the MEI procedure were limited by intrinsic uncertainty of the listeners represented in the MCPF catalog. In other words, the MCPF provided insufficient predictive power to significantly improve adaptive-tracking efficiency under practical conditions. Concurrent optimization of both the MCPF catalog and the MEI-adaptive procedure have the potential to produce better results. Regardless of the adaptive-tracking method used in the CLS procedure, the MCPF catalog remains clinically useful for enabling maximum-likelihood determination of loudness categories. (shrink)

The “happiness agenda” is a worldwide movement that claims that happiness is the highest good, happiness can be measured, and public policy should promote happiness. Against Happiness is a thorough and powerful critique of this program, revealing the flaws of its concept of happiness and advocating a renewed focus on equality and justice. Written by an interdisciplinary team of authors, this book provides both theoretical and empirical analysis of the limitations of the happiness agenda. The authors emphasize that this movement (...) draws on a parochial, Western-centric philosophical basis and demographic sample. They show that happiness defined as subjective satisfaction or a surplus of positive emotions bears little resemblance to the richer and more nuanced concepts of the good life found in many world traditions. Cross-cultural philosophy, comparative theology, and social and cultural psychology all teach that cultures and subcultures vary in how much value they place on life satisfaction or feeling happy. Furthermore, the ideas promoted by the happiness agenda can compete with rights, justice, sustainability, and equality—and even conceal racial and gender injustice. Against Happiness argues that a better way forward requires integration of cross-cultural philosophical, ethical, and political thought with critical social science. Ultimately, the authors contend, happiness should be a secondary goal—worth pursuing only if it is contingent on the demands of justice. (shrink)

Instead of interpreting Berkeley in terms of the standard way of relating him to Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke, I suggest we consider relating him to other figures (e.g., Stoics, Ramists, Suarez, Spinoza, Leibniz). This allows us to integrate his published and unpublished work, and reveals how his philosophic and non-philosophic work are much more aligned with one another. I indicate how his (1) theory of powers, (2) "bundle theory" of the mind, and (3) doctrine of "innate ideas" are understood in (...) a way significantly different from that found in the standard account. (shrink)

Recruiting research participants based on genetic information generated about them in a prior study is a potentially powerful way to study the functional significance of human genetic variation, but it also presents ethical challenges. To inform policy development on this issue, we conducted a survey of U.S. institutional review board chairs concerning the acceptability of recontacting genetic research participants about additional research and their views on the disclosure of individual genetic results as part of recruitment. Our findings suggest there is (...) unlikely to be a “one-size-fits-all” solution, but rather several ethically acceptable approaches to genotype-driven recruitment, depending on context. Disclosures made during the consent process for the original study and the clinical validity of the results are key considerations. Researchers must be prepared to communicate and answer questions in clear lay language about what is known and not known regarding the role of genetics in their proposed area of research. (shrink)

The most forceful philosophical objections to belief in God arise from the existence of evil. Bad things happen in the world and it is not clear how this is compatible with the existence of an all-powerful and perfectly loving being. Unsurprisingly then, philosophers have formulated powerful arguments for atheism based on the existence of apparently unjustified suffering. These arguments give expression to what we call the problem of evil. This volume is an engaging introduction to the philosophical problem of evil. (...) Daniel Speak provides a clear overview of the main lines of reasoning in this debate and argues for the defensibility of theistic belief in the face of evil. He fleshes out the distinction between theodicy and defense and guides the reader through the logical, evidential, and hiddenness versions of the problem."--Publisher's description. (shrink)

Friends of Wright-entitlement cannot appeal to direct epistemic consequentialism (believe or accept what maximizes expected epistemic value) in order to account for the epistemic rationality of accepting Wright-entitled propositions. The tenability of direct consequentialism is undermined by the “Truth Fairy”: a powerful being who offers you great epistemic reward (in terms of true beliefs) if you accept a proposition p for which you have evidence neither for nor against. However, this chapter argues that a form of indirect epistemic consequentialism seems (...) promising as a way to deal with the Truth Fairy problem. The relevant form of indirect consequentialism accommodates evidentialism but allows for exceptions in the case of anti-sceptical hypotheses. Since these are the kind of propositions to which Wright-entitlement is supposed to apply—i.e. cornerstone propositions—indirect consequentialism is entitlement-friendly. (shrink)

While Strawsonians have focused on the way in which our “reactive attitudes”—the emotions through which we hold one another responsible for manifestations of morally significant quality of regard—express moral demands, serious doubt has been cast on the idea that non-blaming reactive attitudes direct moral demands to their targets. Building on Gary Watson’s proposal that the reactive attitudes are ‘forms of moral address’, this paper advances a communicative view of praise according to which the form of moral address distinctive of the (...) praise-manifesting reactive attitudes (approbation, gratitude) is moral invitation. Like moral demand, moral invitation is a species of directive address presupposing its target’s possession of distinctive agential capacities and, when valid, provides its addressee with reason to give the addressor’s directive discursive uptake. While blame’s demands issue imperatival reasons for compliance (e.g. to acknowledge wrongdoing, apologize, etc.), praise’s invitations provide discretionary reasons to accept credit in jointly valuing the significance of the act for the praiser. In addition to its phenomenological plausibility and contribution to the already fecund Watsonian-cum-Strawsonian program, the invitational view helps render intelligible the power of our praise practices to facilitate the formation and enrichment of our interpersonal relationships. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the newly developed network approach in neuroscience and biology provides a basis for formulating a unique type of realization, which I call topological realization. Some of its features and its relation to one of the dominant paradigms of realization and explanation in sciences, i.e. the mechanistic one, are already being discussed in the literature. But the detailed features of topological realization, its explanatory power and its relation to another prominent view of realization, namely (...) the semantic one, have not yet been discussed. I argue that topological realization is distinct from mechanistic and semantic ones because the realization base in this framework is not based on local realisers, regardless of the scale but on global realizers. In mechanistic approach, the realization base is always at the local level, in both ontic and epistemic accounts. The explanatory power of realization relation in mechanistic approach comes directly from the realization relation-either by showing how a model is mapped onto a mechanism, or by describing some ontic relations that are explanatory in themselves. Similarly, the semantic approach requires that concepts at different scales logically satisfy microphysical descriptions, which are at the local level. In topological framework the realization base can be found at different scales, but whatever the scale the realization base is global, within that scale, and not local. Furthermore, topological realization enables us to answer the “why” questions, which according to Polger 2010 make it explanatory. The explanatoriness of topological realization stems from understanding mathematical consequences of different topologies, not from the mere fact that a system realizes them. (shrink)

The study consists of a phenomenological reflection on the essence of man based on the meaning of his discourse in the era of technique. Considering the history of metaphysics at its end, in which all saying and thinking are commanded by information technologies, one wonders about the situation of language, understood as the pronouncement of human existence. Based on Heidegger's phenomenology and, particularly, on the notion of discourse as a fundamental structure made explicit by Sein und Zeit's existential ontology, it (...) is demonstrated that the focus of the discussion is not simply to question the instrumental use and technological application of language. Rather, the key for elaborating the interrelationship between discourse and technique is to capture the sense by which the contemporary man discourses his existence-in-the-world, transitioning from an original way of saying and understanding himself to one in which he and his world are governed by a challenging and provocative power of realness in his reality. It is shown that, to guarantee this contemporary man’s position with the entities, it is necessary for the technique to be a meaning to pronounce its existence, providing the meaning of being-device for the existence and its own possibilities, as well as for the mundane things. At the same time, it is clarified that, since the realization of human existence is guided by this meaning and challenging power represented by the technique, the instrumentalization of languages and their reduction to a communication system managed by information technologies, among other consequences, are required. (shrink)

We present a one per cent measurement of the cosmic distance scale from the detections of the baryon acoustic oscillations in the clustering of galaxies from the Baryon Oscillation Spectroscopic Survey, which is part of the Sloan Digital Sky Survey III. Our results come from the Data Release 11 sample, containing nearly one million galaxies and covering approximately 8500 square degrees and the redshift range 0.2 < z < 0.7. We also compare these results with those from the publicly released (...) DR9 and DR10 samples. Assuming a concordance Λ cold dark matter cosmological model, the DR11 sample covers a volume of 13 Gpc3 and is the largest region of the Universe ever surveyed at this density. We measure the correlation function and power spectrum, including density-field reconstruction of the BAO feature. The acoustic features are detected at a significance of over 7σ in both the correlation function and power spectrum. Fitting for the position of the acoustic features measures the distance relative to the sound horizon at the drag epoch, rd, which has a value of rd,fid = 149.28 Mpc in our fiducial cosmology. We find DV = at z = 0.32 and DV = at z = 0.57. At 1.0 per cent, this latter measure is the most precise distance constraint ever obtained from a galaxy survey. Separating the clustering along and transverse to the line of sight yields measurements at z = 0.57 of DA = and H =. Our measurements of the distance scale are in good agreement with previous BAO measurements and with the predictions from cosmic microwave background data for a spatially flat CDM model with a cosmological constant. © 2014 The Author Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Royal Astronomical Society. (shrink)

Examining the ethics of long-term, career involvement by physicians in global health work is vital, given growing professional interest and potential health implications for communities abroad. However, current literature remains heavily focused on ethical considerations of short-term global health training experiences. A literature review informed our development of an ethics framework centered on two perspectives: the practitioner perspective, further subdivided into extrinsic and intrinsic factors, and community perspectives, specifically that of the host community and the physician’s home community. Some physician (...) factors included cultural/linguistic differences, power imbalances, and sustainable skills/competencies. Receiving community factors included resource limitations, standard of care disparities, and community autonomy. Home community factors focused on the opportunity cost of an unavailable physician who was trained and supported by the local community. Descriptive review permitted comparison with existing short-term literature, noting similarities and differences. Our framework provides a basis for further research and critical analysis of ethical implications of career-long physician global health work. (shrink)

Book Reviews in this article Baptism and Resurrection: Studies in Pauline Theology against its Graeco‐Roman Background. By A.J.M. Wedderburn. Meaning and Truth in 2 Corinthians. By Frances Young and David Ford. Jesus and God in Paul's Eschatology. By L. Joseph Kreitzer. The Acts of the Apostles : By Hans Conzelmann. The Genesis of Christology: Foundations for a Theology of the New Testament. By Petr Pokorny. The Incarnation of God: An Introduction to Hegel's Theological Thought as Prolegomena to a Future Christology. (...) By Hans Küng, translated by J.R. Stephenson. The Incarnation: Collected Essays in Christology. By Brian Hebblethwaite. Models for God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age. By Sallie McFague. Pp. xv, 224, London, SCM Press, 1987, £8.50 Symbol and Sacrament: A Contemporary Sacramental Theology. By Michael G. Lawler. The Sacrifice We Offer: The Tridentine Dogma and its Reinterpretation. By David N. Power. New Eucharistic Prayers: An Ecumenical Study of their Development and Structure. Edited by Frank C. Senn. To Join Together: The Rite of Marriage. By Kenneth W. Stevenson. Company of Voices: Daily Prayer and the People of God. By George Guiver. The Long‐Legged Fly. By Don Cupitt. Approaches to Auschwitz. By Richard L. Rubenstein and John K. Roth. Natural Law and Justice. By Lloyd L. Weinreb. Christian Morality: The Word Becomes Flesh. By Josef Fuchs S.J., translated by Brian McNeil. Medicine in Contemporary Society: King's College Studies 1986–87. Edited by Peter Byrne. Military Ethics: Guidelines for Peace and War. By N. Fotion and G. Elfstrom. Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action. By Alan Donagan. Persons and Personality: A Contemporary Inquiry. Edited by Arthur Peacocke and Grant Gillet. The Rationality of Emotion. By Ronald de Sousa. The Psychology of Personality: An Epistemological Inquiry. By James T. Lamiell. Aesthetics: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art. By Anne Sheppard. The Ascetic Element in Culture and Criticism. By Geoffrey Gait Harpham. Electric Language: A Philosophical Study of Word Processing. By Michael Heim. Education and Philosophical Anthropology: Toward a New View of Man for the Humanities and English. By David Holbrook. Evolution and the Humanities. By David Holbrook. Further Studies in Philosophical Anthropology. By David Holbrook. Women in Western Political Philosophy. Edited by Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus. The Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche and Descartes. By Nicholas Jolley. Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas. By Stephen M. Nadler. Later Medieval Philosophy : An Introduction. By John Marenbon. Either/Or. By Søren Kierkegaard, translated by Howard and Edna Hong, Princeton University Press, 1987: Vol. One, Wittgenstein. By A.C. Grayling. Questions on Wittgenstein. By Rudolf Haller. The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. By David Pears, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Vol. One, The Later Wittgenstein: The Emergence of a New Philosophical Method. By S. Stephen Hilmy. Knowledge of God: Calvin, Einstein and Polanyi. By Iain Paul. Conceptual Change and Religious Practice with Special Reference to Jews in Britain and Israel. By Janice Williams. The World's Religions. Edited by Stewart Sutherland, Leslie Houlden, Peter Clarke and Friedhelm Hardy. Religions in Conversation: Christian Identity and Religious Pluralism. By Michael Barnes. Theravāda Buddhism, A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modem Colombo. By Richard Gombrich. Mahāyāna Buddhism, The Doctrinal Foundations. By Paul Williams. Hinduism in Great Britain: The Perpetuation of Religion in an Alien Cultural Milieu. Edited by Richard Burghart. The Way of the Black Messiah. By Theo Witvliet. The Meaning of Religious Conversion in Africa. By Cyril C. Okorocha. Common Ground: Christianity, African Religion and Philosophy. By Emmanuel K. Twesigye. Islamic Spirituality I: Foundations. Edited by Seyyed Hossein Nasr. The Great Cosmic Mother: Rediscovering the Religion of the Earth. By Monica Sjöö and Barbara Mor. Judaism and Christianity in the Age of Constantine. By J. Neusner. Language and the Worship of the Church. Edited by David Jasper and R.C.D. Jasper. The Urban Character of Christian Worship: The Origins, Development and Meaning of Stational Liturgy. By John E. Baldovin. Leontii Presbyteri Constantinopolitani Homiliae. Edited by Cornells Datema and Pauline Allen. Law, Sex and Christian Society in Medieval Europe. By James A. Brundage. Melchior Hoffman: Social Unrest and Apocalyptic Visions in the Age of Reformation. By Klaus D Alonso de Zorita: RoyalJudge and Christian Humanist, 1512–1585. By Ralph H. Vigil. Pedro Moya de Contreras: Catholic Reform and Royal Power in New Spain, 1571–1591. By Stafford Poole. Archbishop William Laud. By Charles Carlton. The Social History of Religion in Scotland since 1730. By Callum G. Brown. Pastors and Pluralism in Württemberg, 1918–1933. By David J. Diephouse. The Churches and the Third Reich, Vol. One: Preliminary History and the Time of Illusions, 1918–1934. By Klaus Scholder. Reforming Fundamentalism. Fuller Seminary and the New Evangelicalism. By George M. Marsden. The Hellenistic Philosophers Vol. II: Greek and Latin Texts with Notes and Bibliography. By A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley. Prayers of the Eucharist: Early and Reformed. Edited by R.C.D. Jasper and G. J. Cuming. The Way of Paradox: Spiritual Life as Taught by Meister Eckhart. By Cyprian Smith. Meister Eckhart: The Man from whom God Hid Nothing. Edited by Ursula Fleming. The Spiritual Exercises of St Ignatius Loyola: A New Translation. Translated by Elisabeth Meier Tetlow. Courtfield and the Vaughans: An English Catholic Inheritance. By Mary Vaughan. Trinity College, Washington D.C.: The First Eighty Years, 1897–1977. By Columba Mullaly. John Henry Newman on the Idea of Church. By Edward Jeremy Miller. Journey from Paradise: Aft Athos and the Interior Life. By Ralph Harper. (shrink)

Berkeley argues that claims about divine predication (e.g., God is wise or exists) should be understood literally rather than analogically, because like all spirits (i.e., causes), God is intelligible only in terms of the extent of his effects. By focusing on the harmony and order of nature, Berkeley thus unites his view of God with his doctrines of mind, force, grace, and power, and avoids challenges to religious claims that are raised by appeals to analogy. The essay concludes by (...) showing how a letter, supposedly by Berkeley, to Peter Browne ("discovered" in 1969 by Berman and Pittion) is, in fact, by John Jackson (1686-1763), controversial theologian and friend of Samuel Clarke. (shrink)

The field K((G)) of generalized power series with coefficients in the field K of characteristic 0 and exponents in the ordered additive abelian group G plays an important role in the study of real closed fields. Conway and Gonshor (see [2, 4]) considered the problem of existence of non-standard irreducible (respectively prime) elements in the huge "ring" of omnific integers, which is indeed equivalent to the existence of irreducible (respectively prime) elements in the ring K((G ≤ 0 )) of (...) series with non-positive exponents. Berarducci (see [1]) proved that K((G ≤ 0 )) does have irreducible elements, but it remained open whether the irreducibles are prime i.e.; generate a prime ideal. In this paper we prove that K((G ≤ 0 )) does have prime elements if G = (R, +) is the additive group of the reals, or more generally if G contains a maximal proper convex subgroup. (shrink)

E-approaches to the mind stress the embodied, embedded and enactive nature of mental phenomena. In their more radical, non-representational variants these approaches offer innovative and powerful new ways of understanding fundamental modes of intersubjective social interaction: I-approaches. While promising, E and I accounts have natural limits. In particular, they are unable to explain human competence in making sense of reasons for actions in folk-psychological terms. In this paper I outline the core features of the 'Narrative Practice Hypothesis' (NPH), showing how (...) it might take up that burden in a way which complements non-representationalist E and I accounts. I conclude by addressing a new-order eliminativist challenge from Ratcliffe that questions, inter alia, the very idea that there is anything like a well-defined folk-psychological competence that needs explaining, thereby rendering the NPH otiose. Additionally, I respond to Ratcliffe's claim that the relevant structures needed for the development of that competence do not reveal themselves in relevant narratives, rendering the NPH's developmental story impossible. (shrink)

RESUMO O texto propõe um retorno a alguns conceitos e filósofos relevantes para o debate sobre o contrato social no século XVII: a partir de certos princípios sobre os quais se assenta o alcance inovador e crítico da teoria hobbesiana, e vendo no contrato social um suporte causal para o entendimento e a intervenção política, procuro compreender em que sentido o conceito de transferência deve convir ao de poder absoluto do soberano e o que isso implica de crítica à ideia (...) de direito de resistência, como o entendia Althusius, e de defesa de uma ruptura radical entre tempos de guerra e de paz. Reconstruo com essa crítica a tese hobbesiana da obediência como fundamento da permanência da Cidade - e algumas consequências disso; finalmente, proponho uma hipótese sobre a obra de Espinosa que permita a desconstrução das ideias de transferência e de contrato, dentro de um campo de causalidade que põe o conflito e a resistência como constitutivos da própria sociabilidade, sem o essencial recurso ao conceito althusiano de representação, e sem o fundo despolitizador presente na teoria de Hobbes. ABSTRACT The text proposes a return to some relevant concepts and philosophers to debate about the social contract in the XVII century: from certain principles on which is based the innovative and critical reach of Hobbes's theory, and seeing in the social contract a causal support for political understanding and intervention, I seek to understand in what sense the concept of transference must agree with to that of absolute sovereign's power and how it implies a criticism to the ideia of right of resistance, as understood Althusius, and how it implies a defense of a radical break between times of war and peace. I rebuild, with this critique, the hobbesian thesis of obedience as foundation of permanence of the City - and some consequences of it. Finally, I propose a hypothesis about Spinoza's work that allows the deconstruction of transfer ideas and contract, within a causal field that puts the conflict and the resistance as constitutive items of sociability itself, without the essential resource to the althusian concept of representation and without the depoliticized background present in Hobbes's theory. (shrink)

Moral hypocrisy is motivation to appear moral yet, if possible, avoid the cost of actually being moral. In business, moral hypocrisy allows one to engender trust, solve the commitment problem, and still relentlessly pursue personal gain. Indicating the power of this motive, research has provided clear and consistent evidence that, given the opportunity, many people act to appear fair (e.g., they flip a coin to distribute resources between themselves and another person) without actually being fair (they accept the flip (...) only if it favors themselves). New evidence also indicates the power of moral hypocrisy in a situation more obviously relevant to business, resource allocation when one party has information about relative resource value that the other does not. Characteristics of modern business situations likely to encourage moral hypocrisy are outlined. We conclude that moral hypocrisy is not only a pragmatic virtue in modern business but is also fast becoming a prescriptive one. (shrink)

Recent neuropaleontological research suggests that the parietal lobe has increased in size as much as the frontal lobes in Homo Sapiens over the past 150,000 years, but has not provided a neuropsychological explanation for the evolution of human socialization or the development of religion. Drawing from several areas of research, (i.e., neurodevelopment, neuropsychology, paleoneurology, cognitive science, archeology, and anthropology), we argue that parietal evolution in Homo sapiens integrated sensations and mental processes into a more integrated subjective “sense of self”. This (...) enhanced self advanced prosocial traits (e.g., increased empathy, greater social bonding, enhanced theory of mind capacities), promoting more effective socialization skills (e.g., parenting, group cooperation). Conversely, when this enhanced sense of self became inhibited, powerful experiences of self-transcendence occurred. We believe these potent selfless experiences became increasingly sought after though ritual means (e.g., music, dance, vision quests, spirit travel), providing the foundations for the development of shamanism and religion. (shrink)

English summary: This ambitious volume examines the Foucaults later writings from the 1980s. Foucaults contemporaries were baffled by his new perspective from this period in which he explored the modalities of a relationship with the self and the truth, seeming to blur the image of a Foucault concerned with describing and denouncing the forms of contemporary power. This study brings to light the theoretical and practical aspects of this period, in order to a reinvention of our own actuality. French (...) description: Les recherches menees par Foucault au cours des annees quatre-vingt demeurent, a beaucoup d'egards, indecidables. Doit-on parler, a leur propos, d'un retour aux questions classiques du sujet, de la morale, de la liberte? D'un abandon de la mise en perspective politique? D'un dandysme esthetisant? Les contemporains furent profondement deconcertes par des analyses qui, en se concentrant sur les modalites du rapport a soi et a la verite dans l'Antiquite ou le christianisme primitif, paraissaient brouiller l'image d'un Foucault attache a decrire et denoncer les formes du pouvoir moderne. Le present ouvrage se propose de relever le defi pose par ce dernier moment, aussi fecond que provocateur, de la pensee foucaldienne, d'en degager les enjeux theoriques et pratiques, et de se donner les moyens, a partir d'eux, de reinventer notre actualite. (shrink)

Pogge, O'Neill, Elkins, and others propose the "dispersal" or "unbundling" of state sovereignty, allegedly to disincentivize war, to foster global and regional cooperation on environment, justice, and other issues of naturally supra-state concern, as well as to tailor some functions or jurisdictions to more local, regional, or differently shaped geographical areas. All these proposals are guilty of function-atomism, i.e. they ignore the massive benefits of clustering identically bounded functions or jurisdictions in a single territory. These benefits include the effective enforcement (...) of law; the effective production of public goods and deterrence of free-riding; the coinciding of the tax base, law formation and enforcement and sustaining community of media, schools, universities, and other vital institutions; and the fostering of democratic community and participation in a significant political structure. (shrink)

Is the view supported that consciousness is a mysterious phenomenon and cannot succumb, even with much effort, to the standard methods of cognitive science? The lecture, using the analogy of the magician’s praxis, attempts to highlight a strong but little supported intuition that is one of the strongest supporters of this view. The analogy can be highly illuminating, as the following account by LEE SIEGEL on the reception of her work on magic can illustrate it: “I’m writing a book on (...) magic”, I explain, and I’m asked, “Real magic?” By real magic people mean miracles, thaumaturgical acts, and supernatural powers. “No”, I answer: “Conjuring tricks, not real magic”. Real magic, in other words, refers to the magic that is not real, while the magic that is real, that can actually be done, is not real magic. I suggest that many, e.g., DAVID CHALMERS has perpetrated the same feat of conceptual sleight-of-hand in declaring to the world that he has discovered “The Hard Problem” of consciousness. It is, however, possible that what appears to be the Hard Problem is simply the large bag of tricks that constitute what CHALMERS calls the Easy Problems of Consciousness. These all have mundane explanations, requiring no revolutions in physics, no emergent novelties. I cannot prove that there is no Hard Problem, and CHALMERS cannot prove that there is. He can appeal to your intuitions, but this is not a sound basis on which to found a science of consciousness. The “magic” of consciousness, like stage magic, defies explanation only so long as we take it at face value. Once we appreciate all the non-mysterious ways in which the brain can create benign “userillusions”, we can begin to imagine how the brain creates consciousness. (shrink)

��This experiment found that the speed of thought affects mood. Thought speed was manipulated via participants’ paced reading of statements designed to induce either an elated or a depressed mood. Participants not only experienced more positive mood in response to elation than in response to depression statements, but also experienced an independent increase in positive mood when they had been thinking fast rather than slow—for both elation and depression statements. This effect of thought speed extended beyond mood to other experiences (...) often associated with mania (i.e., feelings of power, feelings of creativity, a heightened sense of energy, and inflated self-esteem or grandiosity). (shrink)

Resumo: O presente artigo tem por objetivo apresentar o tema da corrupção, a partir da filosofia política de Enrique Dussel. No marco dos movimentos críticos que emergem no chamado Sul Global, a produção teórica de Dussel busca desenvolver uma estrutura que possibilite a crítica ao que denomina como fetichização do poder. Esse conteúdo é abordado como fundamento da corrupção das instituições que, despercebido pela tradição filosófica moderna, implica uma teoria política que legitima o poder corrompido. Na argumentação aqui concretizada, será (...) exposta a arquitetônica da política dusseliana, distinguindo os conceitos de potentia e potestas. Estes, por sua vez, permitem a diferenciação entre o uso delegado do poder e a execução corrompida do poder. Em seguida, será explicitado o movimento que Dussel assume da crítica de Marx à economia política, para, então, indicar o conteúdo material a partir do qual a constituição crítica de uma nova teoria política deve ser desenvolvida - inspirado em experiências políticas latino-americanas.: The purpose of this article is to present the theme of corruption, based on Enrique Dussel’s political philosophy. Under the scope of the critical movements that emerge in the so-called Global South, Dussel’s theoretical production aims to develop a structure that makes it possible to criticize what he calls the fetishization of power. The fetishization of power is presented as a foundation for the corruption of institutions that, unnoticed by the modern philosophical tradition, implies a political theory that legitimizes corrupted power. In our argument, we will expose the architecture of Dusselian politics, distinguishing the concepts of potentia and potestas. These concepts, in turn, allow for the differentiation between the delegated use of power and the corrupt execution of power. Then, we will make explicit the movement that Dussel assumes from Marx’s critique of political economy to indicate the material content from which the critical constitution of a new political theory must be developed - content that is inspired by Latin American political experiences. (shrink)

Starting from the recognition of the difficulty of establishing peace and the observation that several attempts to terminate conflicts end in failure, the author puts forward the argument that peace is a state that is essentially a by-product, according to the definition given by Jon Elster in his homonymous paper of 1981. Such states are characterized by the fact that they can only be brought about by actions aimed at other ends, i.e. non-intentionally. According to the author it is in (...) the light of this notion that we must consider the strategies implemented by the pacifying power in a so-called pacification war. In fact, what follows from such a war is rarely peace. The question arises to know how much the pacifying power is conscious of this fact and what follows from it both politically and morally. (shrink)

In his recent John Locke Lectures, Robert Brandom defends a view of pragmatism as an extension of the classical project of semantic analysis powerful enough as to incorporate not only relations among meanings, but also, and more fundamentally, relations among meaning and use. The paper explores one of the core aspects of this project – the relation between modal, normative, and empirical vocabularies. Brandom’ focus on a general semantics for non-logical vocabularies intends to meet and answer the empiricist concerns about (...) the intelligibility of modal concepts, which are themselves couched in a modal metavocabulary. Brandom’s purpose is to show that, in using ordinary empirical vocabulary, «in order to be able to talk at all, to make claims and inferences, one must already know how to do everything necessary in principle to deploy modal and normative vocabulary». This is the so-called «Kant-Sellars thesis». In the first part, I present the general framework of analytic pragmatism, the rationale for that project, and its normative foundation. Although the project is in continuity with the goal, pursued in Making It Explicit, of explaining inferential semantics in terms of a normative pragmatics, more structure is added, which clarifies the foundation of the overall enterprise. In the second part, I focus on some objections to the complementary structure of normative and modal vocabularies, and defend a different interpretation of its foundational structure. The goal is to show the modal vocabulary underlies the conceivability and the very inferential practices in which normative vocabulary is involved. (shrink)

First, a joke that was circulating among academics a couple of years ago. In the version I heard, a Texan is walking across Harvard Yard. He stops a guy and asks him, in his nasal drawl, “Can you tell me where the library’s at?” The guy looks him up and down, pauses, and says, “At Harvard we do not end our sentences with prepositions.” The Texan apologizes, saying, “Excuse me. Can you tell me where the library’s at, asshole?”This story may (...) seem far removed from the subject of this essay, which is supposed to be a serious one. But what is the joke about, after all, if not the seriousness of language, its power, and the demystification of that power by our native brand of deconstructionist, the shrewd rube?[…]If we find the joke funny, I imagine that the experience with which most of us identify is this: we want the gumption to reject an arrogant cultural authority. This experience may be especially appealing to students, but it also may appeal to intellectuals conscious of those problems of power and knowledge that have been so celebrated in recent years. In fact, if Friedrich Nietzsche was right in suggesting that grammar is a metaphysical discipline comparable to God, then the pleasure of this joke may lie in its humiliation of law, pure and simple. Sigmund Freud, among others, has suggested that figures of authority in jokes are only stand-ins of that general power of society over all individuals which is contested in the very form of the joke. Thus, following Freud, or, say, those who have made Mikhail Bakhtin’s conception of carnival so popular a topic of academic discussion, we could see enjoyment of this joke as representing a momentary rebellion against every form of culture that, as the saying goes, it imposed upon us. From that perspective, even my use here of this joke is bound to seem ridiculous; indeed, academic psychologists who write on laughter and humor often preface their discussions with defensive remarks about people who find it funny to see intellectuals seriously and laboriously analyzing jokes.1 1. See, e.g., Anthony J. Chapman and Hugh C. Foot, eds., It’s a Funny Thing, Humour , and Paul E. McGhee and Jeffrey H. Goldstein, eds., Handbook of Humor Research, 2 vols. . Daniel Cottom is associate professor of English at Wayne State University. He is the author of The Civilized Imagination and is currently working on a study of the politics of interpretation. (shrink)

This work aims to examine the concept of inoperosità proposed by Giorgio Agamben – in the last phases of his project entitled Homo Sacer – and pointed as a possible vehicle of evasion of the diagnosis of sovereign power and bare life’s hypertrophy. Proceeding to the reading and analysis of Il regno e la gloria, published in 2007, and Nudità, published in 2009, the text that follows might not only reclaim the genesis of the concept but it might also (...) try to demonstrate how the concept arises to those that dedicate themselves to the task of thinking contemporary politics, without leaving behind the question about its pervasion force. In this context it is also important to investigate how the notion of inoperosity may be conceptually absorbed as well as to study the appropriated ways to disarticulate the dispositives of power – which are operative principles both to the relation between law and violence, as the relation between culture and knowledge. (shrink)

While it is possible, as Vivian Sobchack and others show, to illuminate film through Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, it is more difficult to find within Merleau-Ponty’s work a coherent and systematic reflection on cinema. This absence is seldom interrogated. This article addresses what this absence might reveal by analyzing the reasons why Merleau-Ponty stopped short of an explicit discussion of film. The argument builds on these analyses to show how what Merleau-Ponty found problematic about cinema might turn out to be one of (...) cinema’s most resourceful features. For Merleau-Ponty, cinema is caught between a deadening exactitude and a disappointing partiality. It is because of these two apparently opposing extremes that Merleau-Ponty sidelines cinema. However, the pairing of exactness and partiality provides an interesting moment for reflection. Intuitively the two should not coexist, since they appear mutually exclusive. Yet their coexistence seems to renew rather than foreclose a thinking of film. Guided by these two terms, Jean-Luc Nancy produces his own thought on cinema. To show how film is apt at capturing the essential excess and ambiguity of the world, the article will turn to the Lebanese film Je Veux Voir, which offers a powerful instance of cinema’s simultaneous exactitude and partiality.Bien qu’il soit possible, comme Vivian Sobchack et d’autres l’ont démontré, d’illuminer le cinéma à partir de la philosophie de Merleau-Ponty, il est beaucoup plus difficile de trouver dans l’oeuvre de Merleau-Ponty une réflexion cohérente et systématique sur le cinéma. Cette absence est rarement interrogée pour elle-même. Cet article considère ce que cette absence peut révéler en analysant les raisons pour lesquelles Merleau-Ponty ne s’est pas engagé dans une réflexion explicite sur le cinéma. En nous appuyant sur ces analyses, nous montrons que ce que Merleau-Ponty trouvait de plus problématique dans le cinéma est peut-être sa ressource la plus précieuse. Pour Merleau-Ponty, le cinéma est pris entre une exactitude abrutissante et une partialité décevante, et c’est pour cette raison que Merleau-Ponty le met sur la touche. Cependant, le jumelage de l’exactitude et de la partialité devrait nous donner matière à réflexion. Intuitivement, les deux ne devraient coexister : ils apparaissent s’exclure l’une l’autre. Pourtant, leur coexistence est en mesure de renouveler plutôt que d’exclure une pensée du cinéma. C’est guidé par ces deux termes que Jean-Luc Nancy produit sa propre pensée du cinéma. Pour montrer comment le cinéma est à même de capturer l’excès et l’ambiguïté essentiels du monde, nous proposons une lecture du film libanais Je Veux Voir, et montrons comment il offre un exemple puissant de la simultanéité de l’exactitude et de la partialité dans le cinéma. Mentre è possibile, come Vivian Sobchack e altri hanno mostrato, comprendere il film attraverso la filosofia di Merleau-Ponty, risulta più difficile rintracciare all’interno del suo lavoro una riflessione coerente e sistematica sul cinema. Se quest’assenza è stata di rado oggetto di discussione, questo articolo propone invece di interrogarsi sul possibile significato di questa assenza analizzando le ragioni per cui Merleau-Ponty non ha sviluppato una riflessione esplicitamente dedicata al cinema. Sulla base di questa analisi, si intende mostrare che ciò che Merleau-Ponty trova problematico riguardo al cinema può invece rivelarsi una delle sue caratteristiche più preziose. Secondo Merleau-Ponty, il cinema si trova costretto tra una monotona esattezza e una deludente parzialità. È a causa di questi due estremi, apparentemente opposti, che Merleau-Ponty accantona il cinema. Tuttavia, la coppia esattezza-parzialità fornisce un interessante spunto di riflessione. Intuitivamente, i due termini non dovrebbero poter coesistere: sarebbero invece reciprocamente esclusivi. Eppure, la loro coesistenza sembra rinnovare piuttosto che precludere una riflessione sul cinema. È sulla scorta di questi due termini che Jean-Luc Nancy sviluppa il proprio pensiero su questo tema. Al fine di mostrare come il cinema sia in grado di catturare l’eccesso e l’ambiguità essenziali del mondo, l’articolo propone una lettura del film libanese Je Veux Voir, che offre un esempio efficace della simultanea esattezza e parzialità del cinema. (shrink)

The presence of stigmatizing language in the electronic health record (EHR) has been used to measure implicit biases that underlie health inequities. The purpose of this study was to identify the presence of stigmatizing language in the clinical notes of pregnant people during the birth admission. We conducted a qualitative analysis on N = 1117 birth admission EHR notes from two urban hospitals in 2017. We identified stigmatizing language categories, such as Disapproval (39.3%), Questioning patient credibility (37.7%), Difficult patient (21.3%), (...) Stereotyping (1.6%), and Unilateral decisions (1.6%) in 61 notes (5.4%). We also defined a new stigmatizing language category indicating Power/privilege. This was present in 37 notes (3.3%) and signaled approval of social status, upholding a hierarchy of bias. The stigmatizing language was most frequently identified in birth admission triage notes (16%) and least frequently in social work initial assessments (13.7%). We found that clinicians from various disciplines recorded stigmatizing language in the medical records of birthing people. This language was used to question birthing people's credibility and convey disapproval of decision‐making abilities for themselves or their newborns. We reported a Power/privilege language bias in the inconsistent documentation of traits considered favorable for patient outcomes (e.g., employment status). Future work on stigmatizing language may inform tailored interventions to improve perinatal outcomes for all birthing people and their families. (shrink)

Public philosophy distinguishes itself from other philosophical undertakings by either addressing public problems, i.e. those with broad social consequence, or doing the work of philosophy in a public setting beyond the confines of a purely academic environment. The ironic and darkly absurd character of the defining features of civilization and progress – realities Indigenous Peoples have confronted with devastating consequences for centuries – is the way in which both generate tremendous unhappiness and destruction. The living historical character of our cultures (...) is captured in the power plus place equals personality axiom that Deloria formulated. The modus operandi of Indigenous solutions not only addresses the “know‐how” but the moral “should we” dimensions of proposed solutions. Most of humankind talks about resources because the worldview guiding the powerful economic and political interests thinks in those terms about our relatives. (shrink)

This paper shows the role of ὀνοματοποιεῖν in Neoplatonism and how this practice is ruled by an onto-logical canon. While ὀνοματοποιεῖν itself means the making of a brand new name, its usage is manifold. As Aristotle explains in Rh. III 2, poets take advantage of ὀνοματοποιεῖν to catch the undefined and give it a recognisable image, by means of a metaphorical name. In science, this practice, codified by Aristotle, is twofold: ὀνοματοποιεῖν meant both to re-semanticize words wellknown and to create (...) names ex novo for things not discovered or studied yet. After analysing ὀνοματοποιεῖν’s recurrence in Aristotle, I illustrate that, according to Neoplatonic Commentators, impositio can be, both natural and technical, only of things in actuality, having a solid consistency. Intermediates between contraries, presumed relatives and powers as qualities are nameless – as Philoponus notices in his In Categorias – since they haven’t an independent status and aren’t definable. This bond between the original rhetorical practice and the ontological perspective, sketched in Int. 1, was strengthened by Alexander, who filled Aristotle’s gaps, stating that names signify things’ being, i.e. the form acquired in actuality. (shrink)